Transfers from Chile to international organizations: Challenges in coordination and strategic influence
Authors
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Bernardo Navarrete Yáñez
Universidad de Santiago de Chile
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9186-3597
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Abstract
This study examines whether financial transfers from the Chilean state to international organizations (IOs) are strategically oriented toward influencing IO agendas or, alternatively, whether they respond primarily to a reactive logic of institutional compliance. Drawing on data from the Council for Transparency, a systematic literature review, descriptive statistical analysis, and text mining, the study concludes that Chile’s policy on transfers to IOs lacks a consolidated strategic orientation. In practice, these contributions operate largely as administrative obligations, without explicit objectives of international positioning. Nonetheless, specific cases of voluntary contributions channeled through certain public institutions are identified. The empirical evidence reveals a high concentration of funds in general-purpose organizations, such as the United Nations system, followed by entities with social, cultural, and humanitarian objectives, and to a lesser extent, economic ones. The Undersecretariat of Foreign Affairs centralizes more than 75% of the total transferred, reflecting a highly concentrated management structure. The institutional and public policy implications of these findings are discussed within the broader debates on international governance and state financial accountability.
Keywords:
International organizations , Transparency , Foreign policyReferences
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