The war between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands was strange in several respects. Everyone involved saw her coming months in advance, and yet no one could or wanted to stop it. This paper aims to explore the vast literature on the subject, which is presented sequentially according to various components or explanatory elements: the outcome of the crisis, with special attention to the different perceptions of the main participants and the context in the which decisions were made in each country; military preparations for the actual conduct of the war; the strategic consequences of the war; the implications of war for our understanding of the international system and, finally, how conflicts can be resolved in the future.
Keywords:
Falklands War, Argentina, Great Britain, International Conflict, International System
Author Biography
Joseph Tulchin, Departamento de Historia, Universidad de North Carolina
Director de programas internacionales y profesor del Departamento de Historia, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), EE.UU.
Tulchin, J. (1987). La guerra de las Malvinas de 1982 : un conflicto inevitable que nunca debió haber ocurrido. Estudios Internacionales, 20(78), p. 192–209. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.1987.15735
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