It seems out of the question that the Belaúnde administration has a serious responsibility in the acceleration of the violent spiral in Peru as of 1983. If the first responses of the government to the violence of Shining Path were marked by the undervaluation of the phenomenon, then (from December 1982) transferred the handling of the matter almost entirely to the Armed Forces with profound consecuences. With Alan García the phenomenon has not changed much. We argue that in order to understand the current context of acute violence and to speak seriously about possible solutions, it is essential to start from the situation of the Peruvian institutions, and that certain official responses torpedo with as much or greater efficiency than Shining Path the validity of an institutionality against which is this group has risen.
Keywords:
Peru, Terrorism, Shining Path, Democratic Institutionality, Political Violence
Author Biography
Diego García-Sayán, Escuela de Leyes, Universidad Católica de Lima
Peruano, cientista político y abogado; secretario ejecutivo de la Comisión Latinoamericana de Juristas y profesor de la Escuela de Leyes de la Universidad Católica de Lima.
García-Sayán, D. (1990). Terrorismo y pacificación en el Perú. Estudios Internacionales, 23(90), p. 221–239. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.1990.15541
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