This paper discusses how Hegel understands the principle of contradiction. It is analysed, first, the way Aristotle understands this principle, emphasizing the so called semantic and ontological readings. Then, it is analysed whether it is correct to argue that Hegel rejects this principle, holding here that, strictly speaking, this is not correct. To do this, we present a dialetheist reading of Hegelian logic, which allows to state that: i) Hegel does not accept trivialism and, from i), ii) is not feasible a full rejection of the principle of contradiction in the Hegelian logic. The so-called cognitive contextualism can dismiss some contradictions as mere parameterisations, but does not lead to the strong thesis that Hegel rejects the principle of contradiction.
Miranda Rojas, R. (2013). Hegel, contradiction and dialetheia. Revista De Filosofía, 69, Pág. 169–181. Retrieved from https://revistaei.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/30126
